

THEATER ORGANIZATION

Mode: Seminar

Lesson No. 4-13-S

1. Introduction. This lesson begins with a focus on two important issues of Command & Control; how the CINC may ***geographically*** organize his theater, and how the CINC may establish ***command relationships*** among U.S.-only forces. (Note: We will consider multinational force arrangements later).

After these two areas of C2 are discussed, your instructor will facilitate a dialogue from Group A's readings on Operation Urgent Fury in 1983. It will begin with a selected member of the group providing a brief overview on the operation concept of the operation and the force relationships. The seminar will then analyze that relationship against the operation to evaluate the successes or failures due to the C2 structure. The seminar will then synthesize, and defend, a contemporary force organization using current doctrine from your readings.

The seminar will then turn to a discussion led by Group B on the potential challenges, and possible changes, to commanding and controlling on the future battlefield; one described as a Network-Centric battlefield. Selected readings will support the analysis.

2. Learning Objectives. To enable students to:

a. Comprehend the doctrinal terms and rationale used in the geographic organization of a theater. Be able to later apply that learning to an exercise (e.g. Course 4 end-of-course exercise and later in the Strategic Crisis Exercise [SCE]).

b. Comprehend the theater command and control relationships available to a CINC involving only U.S. forces. Comprehend the rationale and potential problems associated with selecting a particular relationship over another. Apply that learning to an exercise (e.g. Course 4 exercise and the SCE).

c. Analyze the force relationships seen in Operation Urgent Fury and apply current doctrine to synthesize alternatives.

d. Analyze the future environment (according to Scales' reading) and the implications to future C2. Analyze current C2 doctrine and evaluate what must change to "fit" that environment.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks.

(1) Readings:

* Group A: Required readings (1), (2) , (3) and (4) below.

* Group B: Required readings (1), (2) , (3) and (5) below.

(2) Discussion:

*Group A: Be able to discuss the fundamentals of theater organization and C2 found in the joint doctrine readings. Discuss force relationships in Urgent Fury and evaluate the JTF's performance as a result of the organization. Synthesize answers to Points To Consider 4.a-e below.

* Group B: Be able to discuss the fundamentals of theater organization and C2 found in the joint doctrine readings. Next, look upon the future battlefield and analyze what command and control changes will need to occur in our doctrine. Synthesize answers to Points To Consider 4.a-c, and f below.

b. Required Readings.

(1) Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), 10 July 2001. Scan Chapter III, Para 11 thru 17, pp. III-13 thru III-20. Read Chapter V, Para 1 thru 5, pp. V-1 thru V-11 and Para 9 thru 10, pp. V-16 thru V-19. (Student Issue)

(2) Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Pub 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, 13 January 1999. Scan Executive Summary, pp. ix thru xiii. Read Chapter II, pp. II-1 thru II-8. Read Chapter III, pp. III-1 thru III-6, and scan pp. III-7 thru III-13. Read Chapter IV, pages IV-1 thru IV-5. Read Chapter VII, Para 9, pp. VII-15 thru VII-19. (Student Issue)

(3) Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 10 September 2001. Read Chapter II, Para 5 thru 8, pages II-11 thru II-22. (Student Issue)

Group A students also read:

(4) March, James G. Ambiguity and Command: Organizational Perspectives on Military Decision Making. Pittman Publishing, 1986. Read "Decision Making" and "The Grenada Rescue Operation," by ADM (Ret) Joseph Metcalf III. (Course 4 Selected Readings, AY02, Implementing National Military Strategy)

Group B students also read:

(5) Scales, Robert H., Jr. "Cycles of War," Armed Forces Journal International, July 1997, Chapter Two, Vol. 134, No. 12. (Course 4 Selected Readings, AY02, Implementing National Military Strategy)

(6) Scales, Robert H., Jr. Clashes of Visions: Sizing and Shaping Our Forces in a Fiscally Constrained Environment, Chapter Seven. (Course 4 Selected Readings, AY02, Implementing National Military Strategy)

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) [Grp A] - Schwarzkopf, H. Norman. "It Doesn't Take a Hero," Scan pp. 244-258. (Library Reserve Shelf)

(2) [Grp B] - Executive Summary, Network-Centric Warfare Report to Congress, 2001. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I (OASD-C3I). <http://www.c3i.osd.mil/NCW/>

(3) Tutorial - Global Command & Control System (GCCS), <http://gccs.disa.mil/gccs/>

(4) Tutorial - Global Information Grid (GIG), http://www.c3i.osd.mil/doc/dodcio-2000conf/Powerpointfiles/CIOConfGIGArch_files/frame.htm

(5) Tutorial - Joint Force organization <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jrm/jfe.pdf>

(6) For information on the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), see Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, 17 April 1998. (Student Issue)

(7) For information on MOOTW-PKO measures for separating warring factions, see Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations, 12 February 1999, pp. II-26 to II-31. (Student Issue)

4. Points to Consider.

- a. What is the difference between command and control?
- b. What strategic/operational factors does a CINC consider when determining the various operational areas (geographical organization) in a theater?
- c. What factors must a CINC consider when deciding to organize U.S. force components by service, by function, or a combination of these?
- d. Were Urgent Fury forces organized by service, or by function, or a combination, or uniquely so? Was there a good force relationship for landings and operations ashore, and then "flexing" for unforeseen events?
- e. How would you configure the same forces using today's doctrine? Why? What improvement would it offer?
- f. How does the environment of future warfare where knowledge, speed, lethality, and dispersion become paramount, dictate changes to the way we will C2 in that environment?
 - Does the organization change (i.e. become more flattened/less hierarchical, etc.) in network-centric warfare?
 - On a fluid, fast, dispersed battlefield, do geographic control measures become irrelevant or unnecessary?
 - What do you think will be our greatest challenges in commanding and controlling joint forces of the future?

5. Relationship to Professional Joint Education (PJE) Learning Areas.

- a. PJE LA 4.c. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider
- b. PJE LA 5.a. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider
- c. PJE LA 6.a. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider
- d. PJE LA 6.b. Objectives, Readings, Points to Consider

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objectives (ILOs), Enduring, and Special Themes.

- a. ILOs: 7
- b. Enduring Themes: Jointness, History
- c. Special Themes: Transformation, War in the 21st Century